# Falsified Quality Control Inspection Records

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### Introduction

Subject: Falsified Quality Control Inspection

Records

Contractors: Washington Group International

and RTS Wright Industries, LLC

DOE Office: Idaho Operations Office

ID Coordinator: Steve Somers

OE Personnel: Sharon Hurley

## Background

#### CONTRACTOR RESPONSIBILITIES

- BNFL is Prime Contractor on Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project (AMWTP)
- BNFL subcontracted with WGI for the design, procurement and construction of the AMWTP
- WGI issued purchase order to RTS to fabricate the AMWTP Supercompactor Glovebox Suite

## Background (cont'd)

- DOE received allegations from a concerned individual in Feb.
  2002 of
  - Inspection record falsification
  - Misuse of QC stamps
- BNFL/WGI and RTS investigations found
  - Records falsification by RTS
  - Procedure violations related to QC stamps and MRB tags

## Discussion of Breakdowns (RTS)

- RTS generated falsified quality inspection documentation to resolve an undocumented WGI audit finding
- RTS failed to comply with internal procedural requirements related to QA Stamp control and nonconformance tags
- RTS management assessments and quality improvement activities were not effective in identifying problems

## Discussion of Breakdowns (WGI)

WGI failed to adequately implement requirements to approve RTS inspection and test procedures

WGI oversight and assessments of RTS were ineffective

## Key Factors in Enforcement Decision (RTS)

#### Duration and Identification of Deficiencies

- Occurred over many months
- \* Known by RTS supervisory personnel and the Director of Quality Assurance
- Identified to DOE by concerned individual

# Key Factors in Enforcement Decision (RTS)

### Significance

Falsification of lifetime quality records is of high significance

### Positive RTS Behavior

- Acceptance of responsibility for breakdowns
- Aggressive investigation of concerns
- Comprehensive corrective actions

# Key Factors in Enforcement Decision (WGI)

### Duration and Identification of Deficiencies

- Occurred over many months and went undetected by WGI assessments
- Identified to DOE by a concerned individual

#### **Significance**

Moderate - Contributed to falsification of QC records

#### **DOE Concerns**

WGI reluctant to take any QA responsibilities for

## Enforcement Outcome (RTS)

PNOV issued October 2003 citing three violations:

- Tone 820.11 violation at SL II
  - CP \$27,500
  - 50% mitigation
- One Work Processes violation at SL II
  - CP \$13,750 (25% mitigation for self-identification
  - 50% mitigation for CA's)
- One Quality Improvement violation at SL III, no

## Enforcement Outcome (WGI)

- PNOV issued October 2003, citing one violation pertaining to work performance and procurement deficiencies
- SLII, CP \$55,000
- No mitigation for self-identification or corrective actions

## Enforcement Outcome (BNFL)

OE investigation determined BNFL was not responsible for noncompliance

\* BNFL performed comprehensive investigation